Federation of North Vancouver Community Associations

FONVCA AGENDA
THURSDAY April 15th 2010

Place: DNV Hall 355 W. Queens Rd V7N 2K6
Time: 7:00-9:00pm
Chair: Paul Tubb, Pemberton Heights C.A.
Tel: 604-986-8891 email: petubb@hotmail.com

Regrets:

1. Order/content of Agenda

2. Adoption of Minutes of Mar 18th
http://www.fonvca.org/agendas/apr2010/minutes-mar2010.pdf

3. Old Business

3.1 Agenda Items for May 5th Shirtsleeve
- fair cost sharing of policing costs
- fair sharing of Rec. Commission costs
- replacement of recreational infrastructure
- top-to-bottom hard look of budget
- improvements in waterfront access

4. Correspondence Issues

4.1 Business arising from 5 regular emails:

4.2 Non-Posted letters – 0 this period

5. New Business
Council and other District issues.
5.1 Economic Impact of Public Infrastructure

http://www.conferenceboard.ca/documents.aspx?did=3492

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_Recovery_and_Reinvestment_Act_of_2009

http://www.statcan.gc.ca/daily-quotidien/090225/dq090225a-eng.htm

http://www.progressive-economics.ca/2009/02/25/public-investment-to-the-rescue/

http://www.statcan.gc.ca/daily-quotidien/090114/dq090114a-eng.htm

http://www.statcan.gc.ca/cgi-bin/IPS/display?cat_num=15-206-XWE2008021

5.2 Sign Bylaw – 5yr limit
From:
http://www.dnv.org/upload/documents/Bylaws/7532.htm

4.3   Any sign in existence on the day that this Bylaw comes into force and which was constructed, placed or installed in accordance with the bylaws of the District and other applicable laws in effect on the date of its construction, placement or installation but which by reason of its size, height, location, design or construction, is not in conformance with the requirements of this Bylaw, may remain in place and continue to be used and maintained for a period of 5 years from the date this bylaw comes into effect, provided that no action is taken or permitted to be taken which increases the degree or extent of the non-conformity or which alters the size, height, location, design or construction of the non-conforming sign except to the extent that the alteration or relocation brings the sign into conformity in all respects with the provisions of this Bylaw.

5.3 Understanding Community Policing
http://www.communitypolicing.ca/

http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/commp.pdf

http://www.lectlaw.com/files/cjs07.htm

http://ssrsbstaff.ednet.ns.ca/aripley/Law12/PolicingandArrest/Policing_in_Canada_Today_1.doc

http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/pi/yj-jj/res-rech/discre/org/supp-appu.html

http://www.northwestern.edu/ipr/publications/policing_papers/caps4.pdf

5.4 Renewal of FONVCA.ORG in Oct/2010
- need to collect dues for another 3-5yr term
- cost is ~ $100/yr

6. Any Other Business
6.1 Legal Issues

6.2 Any Other Issues (2 min each)

7. Chair & Date of next meeting.
Thursday May 15th 2010

Attachments
-List of Email to FONVCA - ONLY NEW ENTRIES
OUTSTANDING COUNCIL ITEMS-Cat Regulation Bylaw; District-wide OCP; Review of Zoning Bylaw; Securing of vehicle load bylaw; Snow removal for single family homes bylaw.

FONVCA Received Correspondence/Subject
15 March 2010 → 12 April 2010

LINK	SUBJECT
http://www.fonvca.org/letters/2010/15mar-to/Brian_Platts_21mar2010.pdf	FONVCA representatives for OCP Workshop
http://www.fonvca.org/letters/2010/15mar-to/Brian_Platts_21mar2010b.pdf	Appreciation sent to Lynn Valley
http://www.fonvca.org/letters/2010/15mar-to/Monica_Craver_21mar2010.pdf	Critical Habitat for Red-Legged Frog needs protection. Mountain biking.
http://www.fonvca.org/letters/2010/15mar-to/Monica_Craver_31mar2010.pdf	Mountain biking & saving the amphibian
http://www.fonvca.org/letters/2010/15mar-to/Wendy_Qureshi_28mar2010.pdf	Violence Against School Staff is on the Rise

FONVCA
Minutes March 18th   2010

Attendees

Brian Platts (**Chair-Pro-Tem**)	Edgemont C.A.
Diana Belhouse(**Notes**)	Save Our Shores
Cathy Adams	Lions Gate N.A.
Dan Ellis	Lynn Valley C.A.
Eric Andersen	Blueridge C.A.
Corrie Kost	Edgemont C.A.
Val Moller	Lions Gate N.A
Paul Tubb	Pemberton Heights C.A..

The meeting was called to order at 7:10 PM

Regrets: Paul Tubb, Del Kristalovich

1. ORDER / CONTENT OF AGENDA
Meeting called to order at 7:10pm

2. Adoption of Minutes of Jan. 21st
   http://www.fonvca.org/agendas/apr2010/minutes-mar2010.pdf
Noted item 3.3 "Date of Shirtsleeve Meeting with Council" – Cathy to follow-up with Clerk's office.
Adopted as circulated.

3. OLD BUSINESS

3.1 2010-2014 Draft Financial Plan
Members commented that the workshop held with FONVCA by DNV staff on **Feb 18th** was well done and clearly presented via a powerpoint presentation.
http://www.fonvca.org/agendas/mar2010/feb18-budget.pdf
Those present were:
Rick Danyluk, Nicole Deveaux, & Madeline Kozak from DNV staff
Corrie Kost, Brian Albinson, Dan Ellis, Eric Andersen, John Hunter, Lyle Craver, Paul Tubb from community associations. References:
http://www.dnv.org/article.asp?a=4733
with Q/A at
http://www.dnv.org/article.asp?a=4742&c=1021
and full schedule of meetings on budget at
http://www.dnv.org/article.asp?c=553
When the rate distribution is discussed by council at the 5-7pm Tues **April 20** Council Workshop there may be a small re-apportionment to the Industrial, Business & Commercial tax rates with corresponding (increase?) in residential tax rates. A small number of residents attended the **March 9th** Special Council Mtg where council (no public input) had a general discussion on Financial Plan. At the **March 2nd** Special Mtg of Council the general public provided input – eg. Brian Albinson (ECA) and Malcolm McLaren – the latter wanting lower industrial taxes.

4. CORRESPONDENCE ISSUES

4.1 Business arising from 9 regular e-mail
Reviewed emails – invite by Grand Boulevard/Ridgeway Resident's Association to attend their Sunday **April 11th** meeting on CNV Mayor presentation on Metro Vancouver 2040" starting about 1:30pm.
No other business arising.

4.2 Non-posted letters – 0 this period.

5. NEW BUSINESS
Council and other District Issues

5.1 Invite to Stakeholders Workshop on Sense of Place, Network of Centres
http://www.fonvca.org/agendas/mar2010/Ross-Taylor-12mar2010.pdf
Council Chambers - Wed March 31 9am-12pm
2-4 additional FONVCA members requested to attend this workshop – to boost stakeholders representation. Paul Tubb, Cathy Adams, Brian Albinson, and Peter Thompson will likely attend. **ACTION**: Chair to send reply to Ross Taylor. A general public mtg on this theme will be held at the hall 7-9pm April 29th . For more details refer to
http://www.identity.dnv.org/
Corrie reported on OCP Stakeholders Mtg held earlier in day (2-4pm March 18th) on Supportive Housing. There were 9 Housing Objectives and Intents (**Proposed for discussion at that meering**). SINCE THIS MATERIAL IS CURRENTLY NOT AVAILABLE ELECTRONICALLY IT IS RETYPED HERE FROM HARDCOPY – WARNING: THERE MAY BE ERRORS

1. Preserve physical character of neighbourhoods while providing for greater housing choice and flexibility
2. Concentrate the majority of new housing development in mixed-use centers
   Policies and Action Re; Supportive Housing:
   a) Ensure that new residential development provide public amenities that contribute to the liveability of the new center meeting the needs of seniors, families and young people (community spaces, green spaces, public art, etc.)
   b) Integrate market, non-market and supportive housing in an equitable (planned? rational?) fashion.
3. Focus housing development around selected major transit corridors/
4. Provide opportunities for individuals to age in place.
   Policies and Action Re; Supportive Housing:
   a) Develop guidelines and review bylaws to improve accessibility in all types of housing
   b) Continue to use existing adaptable design guidelines to facilitate aging in place.
   c) Encourage the provision of housing for seniors on church (school?) sites.
   d) Adjust current regulations and zoning to permit collective living models (e.g. Abbeyfield)
   e) Provide or retain space for adult day-care facilities in the redevelopment of surplus public assembly sites (school sites for seniors housing?)

f) Duplex or triplex stratification of Single Family homes

5. Increase housing choices for young adalts and families with children.
6. Improve quality of housing and security of tenure for the most vulnerable households and individuals.

Policies and Action Re; Supportive Housing:
   a) Partner with non-profits and other (levels of government) to develop supportive housing for those with mental health and/or addiction issues.
   b) Partner with non-profits and other (levels of government) to develop transitional units for youth, families and adults.
   c) Partner with non-profits and other (levels of government) to develop independent living units for people with severe disabilities or other disadvantages as identified.
   d) Ensure future assisted living facilities provide for the care of people with cognitive or mental health deficits.
   e) Work with community partners to develop respite care facilities on the North Shore
   f) Explore innovative and economical housing solutions to reduce the incidence of homelessness on the North Shore (e.g. conversion of shipping containers)
   g) Exclude from density calculation of supportive housing projects spaces that would permit counseling or health-related services within the development.

7. Provide a range of affordable housing in each **community** for owners and renters, through both market and non-market mechanisms.

Policies and Action Re; Supportive Housing:
   a) Reserve 50% of all funds collected through the Community Amenity Contributions into the District's Affordable Housing Fund.
   b) Designate and reserve 10 sites for future affordable or supportive housing development from the existing inventory of District land.

8. Preserve the existing rental housing stock and encourage development of new rental units.
9. Facilitate partnerships and collaboration amoung different components of the housing sector to move the community towards its housing goal.

Policies and Action Re; Supportive Housing:
   a) Strongly encourage the Federal government to develop a [timely] National Housing Strategy.
   b) Encourage Vancouver Coastal Health to create a Housing Coordinator for the North Shore and to increase outreach and support services to supportive housing projects.
   c) Establish a Housing Advisory Committee of Council to work with community partners to advance solutions to the District's housing problems.
   d) Continue to support regional efforts on eliminating homelessness through staff support and other involvements.
   e) Ensure that District's existing Affordable Housing Fund is set up and publicized to receive funds from non-municipal sources such as cash-in-lieu contributions from philanthropic residents, developers upon rezoning, and other amenity related density bonus contributions.
   f) Consider the sale of municipal land to non-profit organizations for non-marhet housing,

under the condition that future resale of the land continues to provide for the original intended purpose.
   g) Encourage all levels of government to provide a portion of undeveloped or surplus land for affordable (non-market?) housing.
   h) Develop shovel-ready affordable (non-market?) housing projects in the District in partnership with community stakeholders, private developers and public agencies, in participation of future funding opportunities.
   i) Work with community partners to create awareness of the magnitude and range of housing challenges on the North Shore, and provide information to the public regarding available housing services and programs including Provincial and Federal subsidies.

Related to the above the differences between market, non-market, and supportive forms of housing were discussed.

Details of the main public OCP Workshops are available at http://identity.dnv.org/upload/pcdocsdocuments/t@x01!.pdf

Instead of discussing the following under agenda item 6.2 the issue of the newly proposed Industrial Zones – dealt with at a Council Workshop held 5pm March 16th - was discussed at this time.

There appear to be some problems related to the new zones as described at
http://www.dnv.org/article.asp?c=771&a=4667
Although the "Good Neighbour Zoning" appears to limit building within 50 ft of residential zones to 30' height they MAY still be built with zero set-back from residential properties. This needs clarification. It was also stated that taxes are based on use – not zoning. Some felt that this was not correct. Again, clarification is required on this essential points. **ACTION** Item. Home based businesses (not day care for example) would be allowed on the residential components allowed on the 4th (top) floor. All else being equal, the expanded uses would appear to bring in increased assessment/taxes.
The public hearing on this is set for 7pm Tues May 11th .

5.2 Reasons/Solutions for poor voter turn-out
http://www.oshawa.ca/agendas/Finance_and_Administration/2009/06-18/FA-09-120_Increasing_Voter_Turnout.pdf

The above provides a good overview on various ways to improve voter turn-out (which has been steadily dropping in many municipalities – and is below 20% in DNV)

Telephone and/or Internet Voting are alternatives discussed.

http://www.cdhalton.ca/pdf/icc/ICC_Ex_Summ_Municipal_Franchise_and_Social_Inclusion_in_Toronto.pdf
The above reference examines reduces voting age and non-citizen voting for Toronto

http://www.thestar.com/news/gta/article/649696
The above examines the pro/cons of allowing long-term (non citizen) residents to vote.

http://www.montrealgazette.com/news/Montrealers+away+from+voting/2165149/story.html
The above examines why Montrealers shy away from voting – with suggestions such as teaching civics in schools, making voting compulsory, and providing a tax credit to those who vote.

Humorous reasons why young people don't vote:
http://media.www.theconcordian.com/voting-right-and-responsibility-1.831265
Rarely do people NOT vote because they are satisfied with the existing government!
Important questions relating to municipal elections discussed were:
- should long time non-Canadian residents be allowed to vote?
- should non-resident owners of businesses be allowed to vote?

5.3 Sustainability Checklist for Municipalities
http://www.municipal.gov.sk.ca/publications/Municipal-Sustainability-Checklist
The above is a (Saskatchewan) guide for Elected Official, Municipal Staff as well as Community Members. Various "health" indicators, such as economic sustainability, community pride, accountability, needed infrastructure, financial health, etc are examined.

(b) Municipal Financing/Sustainability
http://www.fcm.ca/CMFiles/munfin1SIR-3262008-3325.pdf
http://www.town.nanton.ab.ca/Government/MSP09202.pdf
http://www.metrovancouver.org/region/summits/Pages/default.aspx
The above examines the growing gap between the services municipalities must deliver and what they can afford!

5.4 Local Government Elections Task Force
NEWS RELEASE:
http://www2.news.gov.bc.ca/news_releases_2009-2013/2010CD0004-000104.htm

http://www.localelectionstaskforce.gov.bc.ca/background.html

http://www.localelectionstaskforce.gov.bc.ca/library/Backgrounder_on_Local_Government_Elections.pdf

http://www.localelectionstaskforce.gov.bc.ca/library/Local_Election_Cycles_Discussion_Paper.pdf   3 or 4 year term? With newly available legislation councils no longer need to have longer terms to enable long term binding housing agreements – such as the 10 Year Plan for Seylynn.

http://www2.canada.com/northshorenews/news/story.html?id=19496329-93f3-4e7c-8d2b-da638dd8d7b2&p=1
Public meeting on issue being held by CNV 7pm March 22

The Task Force looks forward to receiving written comments as soon as possible, preferably by April 15, 2010.

The non-accountability of various electoral organizations (we only need to recall what happened during the 1999 municipal elections as they relate to the issue of Waterfront Access by special interest groups) among other issues are being examined by the task force. Note that all public input to the task force will be kept confidential. Some felt this to be undemocratic. Of course, as a result there is no accountability for any recommendations put forth by the Task Force. A compromise suggestion that all material be made public – but stripped of who submitted the material,l seems warranted.

5.5 Housing Affordability in Metro Vancouver
http://www.metrovancouver.org/planning/development/housingdiversity/AffordableHousingWorkshopDocs/McClanaghan-MetroVancouverPresentation2008May15.pdf
http://www.metrovancouver.org/planning/development/housingdiversity/AffordableHousingWorkshopDocs/McClanaghanAffordability2008Report.pdf

It appears, that due to much higher average household incomes, that for the average resident of DNV housing is more affordable than CNV and even most Lower Mainland municipalities.
;

6. ANY OTHER BUSINESS

6.1 Legal Issues
a)   **Landslide Court Case** (Perrault vs. DNV)Decision
http://www.canlii.org/en/bc/bcsc/doc/2010/2010bcsc182/2010bcsc182.html
The above was distributed for information – the DNV was not held liable.

b)   **Part 25 of Local Government Act – Regional Growth Strategies**
http://www.bclaws.ca/Recon/document/ID/freeside/96323_29
A "super" public hearing is required to change the zoning on existing industrially zoned properties.Note

that in DNV only a limited number of the industrial zoned properties have been declared to be in the required Regional Context Statement. It was noted that Harbourside Village proposal (for which the CNV will hold an Open House at Westview Elementary School 5:00pm-8:00pm on March 25/2010) plans to build residential (possibly hi-rises) along the waterfront near the Auto-Mall – despite the current light industrial zoning. This would significantly impact traffic flow on Marine Drive – as well as bottleneck the existing hump rail overpass on Fell.

6.2 Any Other Issues (2 min each)

a) **Un-dedication of Dedicated DNV Park Land**
An **Alternative Approval Process** is being used to un-dedicate some of the dedicated parkland of Harbourview Park (in exchange for an almost equal area of Port land, and other works and improvements to the park). The concerns expressed were:
- violation of Council policy **12-6130-1** "Requirement for Assent of the Electors by Referendum for Removal of Park Dedication" adopted Oct 18/2004 found at **http://www.dnv.org/article.asp?c=609**
- That the Federal Government could unilaterally expropriate DNV dedicated parkland if DNV did not approve this land swap/deal
- **The possible precedent setting nature of this issue.**

Full details of land exchange proposal can be found at http://www.dnv.org/upload/documents/Council_Reports/pat2.pdf
The CNR tracks access bridge will likely be higher or will be widened to accommodate the new rails i.e. angle across north end of parking lot to access Port property on west side. Trail linkup under the new bridge to Lynn Creek trail which ends up on Main St in CNV property. Port will pay for natural planting on part of former parking lot. Apparently NVD Parks are getting all they asked for. The exchanged parcel currently has Port buildings on it – they will be razed and paved as new public parking lot.

b) **Advertisements at Tourist Bld located at Cap/Marine.** The large orange billboard – used by Grouse Mtn Resorts seems to have been done without necessary permits/public process. To date her inquiry has had no replies.
c) **Olympic Events at Lynn Valley**
It was suggested that a letter of congratulations be emailed to both the ValleyFest group and organizers of the Olympic Torch Relay. **ACTION**

7. CHAIR AND DATE OF NEXT MEETING

Chair of next meeting:
Paul Tubb – Pemberton Heights C.A.
Tel: 604-986-8891
Email: petubb@hotmail.com

The next FONVCA meeting will be held 7:00pm Thursday April 15th   2010

Meeting was adjourned at ~ 9:00PM.

The Conference Board of Canada
Insights You Can Count On

The Economic Impact of Public Infrastructure in Ontario

Public infrastructure has helped boost Ontario's economy over the past 30 years by increasing its productivity. This report estimates that each dollar of infrastructure spending through ReNew Ontario is adding $1.11 to the province's real GDP.

Report by Pedro Antunes , Kip Beckman , Jacqueline Johnson
The Conference Board of Canada, 39 pages, March 2010

Document Highlights:

- Public capital has long been a strong contributor to the performance of Ontario's private sector—it accounted for 12 per cent of labour productivity gains in Ontario between 1980 and 2008.

- Each dollar of real public infrastructure spending through ReNew Ontario is adding $1.11 to Ontario's real gross domestic product, as well as helping to create jobs, boost personal incomes and corporate profits, and increase tax collections.

- The recent extra boost to infrastructure spending from new initiatives to counter the recession helped lift real GDP growth by 0.9 percentage points in 2009 and is forecast to add a further 0.4 percentage points in 2010.

- If not for the stimulative impact of this added boost to infrastructure spending, Ontario's economy would have lost an additional 70,000 in 2009. In 2010, when infrastructure spending peaks, another 40,000 jobs will be added to the payrolls in the province.

Related Research

- Halifax: Metropolitan Outlook 1, Spring 2010
- Ottawa–Gatineau: Metropolitan Outlook 1, Spring 2010
- Toronto: Metropolitan Outlook 1, Spring 2010
- Hamilton: Metropolitan Outlook 1, Spring 2010
- Winnipeg: Metropolitan Outlook 1, Spring 2010

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Wenonah Bradshaw

History of RPE Thought

April 2010

Public Investment to the Rescue

Posted by Erin Weir under Statscan, investment, public infrastructure.
February 25th, 2009
Comments: 2

The main message in Statistics Canada's release of 2009 investment intentions is that modestly higher public investment will partly offset sharply lower private investment.

The glass-half-full perspective is that things would look far worse without the increase in public investment. The glass-half-empty perspective is that this increase will not be nearly enough to fully offset the loss of private investment.

Statistics Canada's release emphasizes *non-residential* construction and machinery and equipment, presumably because these types of investment contribute most strongly to productivity. However, *residential* construction also contributes to aggregate demand.

Tables updated along with today's release reveal that residential construction intentions are also down, but not as steeply. Figures including residential construction suggest a 5.4% drop in total investment, which is slightly less bad than the 6.6% drop highlighted in today's release.

Capital Investment in Canada ($ billions)

	Private	Public	Total
2007	$268.9	$59.9	$328.8
2008	$273.3	$72.7	$346.0
2009	$247.9	$79.6	$327.5

How much has public investment cushioned the blow from the private sector? Without the 2008-2009 boost in public investment, total investment would have

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been $320.6 billion in 2009, a decline of 7.3% (rather than 5.4%) from the 2008 level.

How much public investment would have been needed to completely close the gap? If public investment had increased by $25.4 billion, total investment would be the same in 2009 as in 2008.

This would have required a 35% rise in public investment as opposed to the expected 9.5% rise. To put both percentages in context, public investment actually rose 21% from 2007 to 2008, accounting for most of the investment increase between those years. If governments could pull off a 21% increase then, they should be able to do better than 9.5% amid the current economic crisis.

Comments

Comment from Robert McClelland
Time: February 26, 2009, 11:15 am

Did you see today's quarterly financial statistics for enterprises? Last year was another banner year for corporate profits $283 billion) yet private sector capital investment for this year are set to decline by $25 billion.

Comment from Erin Weir
Time: February 27, 2009, 6:54 am

Private investment is driven by prospective future profits, rather than by previous record profits.

Write a comment

Name:

E-mail:

Website:

Your comment:

Submit

Related articles

- **Strong Output, Weak Payrolls** (March 31st, 2010)
- **Incredible Shrinking EI Benefits** (March 24th, 2010)
- **Employment Picture Improves** (March 12th, 2010)
- **Foreign Control of Canadian Mining** (March 8th, 2010)
- **This is Your Economy on Stimulus** (March 7th, 2010)

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Study: Impact of public infrastructure on productivity

1962 to 2006

Between 1962 and 2006, roughly one-half of the total growth in multifactor productivity in the private sector was the result of growth in public infrastructure.

Public capital (the nation's roads, bridges, sewer systems and water treatment systems) constitutes a vital input for private sector production. It enables concentrations of economic resources and provides wider and deeper markets for output and employment.

The contribution of public infrastructure to productivity growth has not been constant over time. The largest contributions to productivity growth occurred during the 1960s and early 1970s, when it contributed up to 0.4 percentage points to average annual productivity growth.

During the 1980s and 1990s, its contribution to productivity averaged only 0.1 percentage points a year. The slower growth in the stock of public capital after 1980 occurred as decades of cross-country highway expansion came to an end.

Analysts studying productivity growth have long been faced with the problem of explaining why growth was much higher before 1980 than afterwards. A substantial portion of the difference came from the much higher growth in public infrastructure in the period preceding 1980.

In its analysis, the paper used earlier research that estimated the rate of return to public infrastructure as the impact on private sector costs. It found that the rate centred on 17%. The paper also examined how robust the results were to alternate estimates of the rate of return. To do so, it used a range of estimates of the impact of public capital on private sector costs. All produced results indicating that public capital made a significant contribution to productivity growth.

Note to readers

This release is based on a research paper that uses a growth accounting framework to examine the importance of investment in public infrastructure to the growth in private sector productivity.

Despite the importance of public infrastructure, estimates of its impact on productivity growth are not widely available. The framework that is generally used for productivity analysis focuses only on business sector outputs and inputs, examining how output increases with inputs.

This omission of public capital from the statistical framework used to estimate productivity growth stems from a lack of information needed to include public infrastructure in the calculated measure of productivity, namely information on the magnitude of public capital stock and quantitative estimates of the impact of public infrastructure investments on business sector output.

The recent analytical studies "Infrastructure capital: What is it? Where is it? How much of it is there?," published in *The Canadian Productivity Review* (15-206-XIE2008016, free), and "An examination of public capital's role in production," published in *Economic Analysis Research Paper Series* (11F0027MIE2008050, free), provide new more comprehensive data on public infrastructure and estimates of the impact of public infrastructure on business sector output.

Using this information, this paper produces a new measure of multifactor productivity for the business sector that incorporates the impact of public infrastructure.

Multifactor productivity measures the efficiency with which capital and labour are used in production. Growth in this area is often associated with technological change, organizational change or economies of scale.

The study "The impact of public infrastructure on Canadian multifactor productivity estimates" is now available as part of *The Canadian Productivity Review* (15-206-XWE2008021, free), from the *Publications* module of our website.

For more information on public infrastructure, consult the studies "An examination of public capital's role in production" published in the *Economic Analysis Research Paper Series* (11F0027MIE2008050, free), "Infrastructure capital: What is it? Where is it? How much of it is there?" published in *The Canadian Productivity Review* (15-206-XIE2008016, free), and "Public infrastructure in Canada: Where do we stand?" published in *Insights on the Canadian Economy* (11-624-MIE2003005, free), available from the *Publications* module of our website.

For more information, or to enquire about the concepts, methods or data quality of this release, contact Ryan Macdonald (613-951-5687), Micro-economic Analysis Division.

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The Impact of Public Infrastructure on Canadian Multifactor Productivity Estimates

Issue information

This paper makes use of a growth accounting framework to examine the importance of public capital for private sector productivity growth. Most measures of multifactor productivity consider only the inputs of the business sector. This paper produces an alternate measure of multifactor productivity for the business sector that incorporates the impact of public capital. It uses the estimate of the elasticity of business sector output with respect to public capital derived from Macdonald (2008). Over the period, the conventional estimate of MFP growth averages 0.4% per year. About half of this growth is attributable to public capital.

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Community Policing:
Learning The Lessons Of History

by Jeffrey Patterson
[Sgt. Patterson serves with the Clearwater, Fl, Police Dept.]

An old saying holds that those who cannot remember the past are
condemned to repeat it. Unfortunately, many officers seem to think the
history of police work began the day they first pinned on a badge and
strapped on a gunbelt. For this reason, each emerging movement in law
enforcement tends to be seen as something completely new, without
historical context. Such is largely the case today with community
policing.

To better understand today's debate over community policing, law
enforcement administrators should study their history. History debunks
the more outrageous claims made by some of the proponents of community
policing and cautions against forgetting the important lessons of the
past. It shows us that calls to change the way the police operate have
been a constant theme from the very beginning of municipal policing.
And, it reminds us that our problems today--while serious--are really
nothing new.

SIR ROBERT PEEL'S INNOVATION

The history of modern law enforcement began 166 years ago   with the
formation of the London Metropolitan Police District in 1829. By
creating a new police force, the British Parliament hoped to address the
soaring crime rate in and around the nation's capital, attributed at the
time to rapid urban growth, unchecked immigration, poverty, alcoholism,
radical political groups, poor infrastructure, unsupervised juveniles,
and lenient judges. The principles adopted by Sir Robert Peel, the first
chief of the London Metropolitan Police, for his new "bobbies" have
served as the traditional model for all British and American police
forces ever since. These principles include the use of crime rates to
determine the effectiveness of the police; the importance of a centrally
located, publicly accessible police headquarters; and the value of
proper recruitment, selection, and training.

However, perhaps the most enduring and influential innovation introduced
was the establishment of regular patrol areas, known as "beats." Before
1829, the police--whether military or civilian--only responded after a
crime had been reported. Patrols occurred on a sporadic basis, and any
crime deterrence or apprehension of criminals in the act of committing
crimes happened almost by accident.

Peel assigned his bobbies to specific geographic zones and held them responsible for preventing and suppressing crime within the boundaries of their zones. He based this strategy on his belief that the constables would:

* Become known to the public, and citizens with information about criminal activity would be more likely to tell a familiar figure than a stranger * Become familiar with people and places and thus better able to recognize suspicious persons or criminal activity, and * Be highly visible on their posts, tending to deter criminals from committing crimes in the immediate vicinity.

To implement fully the beat concept, Peel instituted his second most enduring innovation: The paramilitary command structure. While Peel believed overall civilian control to be essential, he also believed that only military discipline would ensure that constables actually walked their beats and enforced the law on London's mean streets, something their nonmilitary predecessors, the watchmen, had failed to do.

EARLY AMERICAN POLICING

Meanwhile, across the Atlantic, American policing developed along lines roughly similar to those of the London police. Most major U.S. cities had established municipal police departments by the Civil War. Like the London police force, these departments adopted a paramilitary structure; officers wore distinctive blue uniforms and walked assigned beats. However, unlike the bobbies, American officers carried guns and were under the command of politically appointed local precinct captains. Lax discipline led to abundant graft.

While the British quickly embraced the bobbies as one of their most beloved national symbols, Americans held their police in much lower esteem. "Of all the institutions of city government in late-nineteenth-century America, none was as unanimously denounced as the urban police," wrote sociologist Egon Bittner. "According to every available account, they were, in every aspect of their existence, an unmixed, unmitigated, and unpardonable scandal."1

REFORM AND PROFESSIONALISM

By the turn of the century, the progressive movement began to promote professionalism in law enforcement as one of the basic components of rehabilitating municipal politics. Concern about corruption and brutality in local police forces resulted in State takeovers of some city departments and led to the creation of new State police organizations removed from the corrupting influences of local ward politics.

Reformers sought to insulate the police from political inter-ference while retaining local government control. The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), founded in 1893, immediately called for the adoption of a civil service personnel system and the centralization of authority in strong executive positions, which could control the politically aligned precinct captains.

Reformers also sought to change the role of the police in American society. In the 19th century, American police enforced health and building codes, secured housing for the homeless, built and supervised playgrounds for children, and even found jobs for ex-convicts. Reformers believed that these duties provided too many opportunities for political favoritism and squandered too many resources that could be better spent fighting crime. They called for the police to give up social work and concentrate on law enforcement.

But while "good government" ideals spurred the quickly emerging professional model, its real driving force was technology--the forensic sciences of ballistics, chemistry, and fingerprinting to some extent, but mostly the automobile, the telephone, and the radio. The radio-equipped patrol car allowed officers to respond to calls for service received by the police switchboard. At the same time, it took officers off the sidewalk and put them on the street, racing from incident to incident observing the crowd only from a distance.

For half a century, proponents lauded professionalism in law enforcement as the solution to the crime problem. Innovative police chiefs across the country worked to implement the professional model in their agencies, while J. Edgar Hoover promoted professionalism through the FBI National Academy. Several major universities also established programs in professional police administration.

UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES

With the passage of time, professionalism yielded some serious, unintended consequences for local police. Agencies became divided between the oldtimers and more progressive college-educated officers. Formal education contributed to higher levels of disenchantment with the more mundane aspects of the job. Demands for efficiency, objectivity, and autonomy led to detached, impersonal attitudes toward the community and resistance to any direction from elected political leaders.

Critics also questioned whether professionalism really was being practiced at the local level. Police departments installed civil service merit systems for hiring and promotion. They adopted a general code of ethics and formed a professional association. They supported their practices through knowledge based on experience. But these local law enforcement agencies conducted no true scientific research, nor did they require a college degree to work in the field.

The failure of professionalism became apparent during the urban riots, assassinations, and gang violence of the last 30 years. Police, politicians, and the public alike bemoaned the ineffectiveness of crime-fighting efforts. Leaders of minority communities cited the lack of police responsiveness to their needs. Everyone agreed that the police had somehow fallen out of touch with the citizens they were supposed to serve and protect.

POLICE-COMMUNITY RELATIONS

One of the earliest articulations of what would later evolve into the community policing philosophy can be found in Skolnick's case study of the San Francisco, California, Police Department's Community Relations Unit. This case study also documents the first organized resistance to the basic concepts of community policing.

In 1962, the San Francisco Police Department established a specialized unit based on the concept that "police would help to reduce crime by reducing despair--by acting as a social service agency to ameliorate some of the difficulties encountered by minority group persons."2 Almost from the outset, the unit found itself hampered by its ambiguous mission. Members were not sure what methods they should apply to serving which minority population.

The unit also faced the dilemma of "how to maintain its identity as a police organization and at the same time to win the confidence of the minority group population...ordinarily considered a police problem."3 Eventually, the relationship of trust between the unit and the community led to formal complaints of misconduct against other police officers, sealing the unit's alienation from the mainstream of the department. The program soon perished in the politically charged environment it inadvertently helped to create.

TEAM POLICING

In the 1970s, a new strategy emerged--team policing. Advocates of team policing recognized that "in recent years, due in part to changes in the social climate and in part to changes in police patrol techniques (more patrol cars, less foot patrol), many police agencies have become increasingly isolated from the community. This isolation makes crime control more difficult."4 The team policing concept assigned responsibility for a certain geographic area to a team of police officers who would learn the neighborhood, its people, and its problems--much like the old cop on the beat. But because authority would not be concentrated in one person, the team policing model posed less danger of corruption. Different American cities tried various forms of team policing, but none ever got beyond the limited "pilot-project" stage, and all eventually fell by the wayside.

A primary reason for team policing's failure rested with its contradiction of the basic tenets of professionalism. It placed more emphasis on long-term problem solving than on rapid response to incidents, making quantifiable performance measurements difficult. It also crossed functional lines of authority, violating the chain of command and trespassing on the turf of detectives and other specialized units.

COMMUNITY POLICING

Community policing is the most widely used term for a loosely defined set of police philosophies, strategies, and tactics known either as problem-oriented policing, neighborhood-oriented policing, or community-oriented policing. However, perhaps "postprofessionalism" or "neotraditionalism" would be more descriptive labels.

Like the police-community relations movement, community policing stems from a view of the police as a multifunctional social service agency working to reduce the despair of poverty. Like team policing, community policing is rooted in the belief that the traditional officer on the beat will bring the police and the public closer together. At the same time, it maintains the professional model's support for education and research.

Instead of merely responding to emergency calls and arresting criminals, community policing officers devote considerable time to performing social work, working independently and creatively on solutions to the problems on their beats. It follows that they make extensive personal contacts, both inside and outside their agencies. All of this flies in the face of a police culture that values crimefighting, standard operating procedures, and a paramilitary chain of command.

Although supporting evidence is largely anecdotal, community policing apparently has received widespread support at the conceptual level from politicians, academicians, administrators, and the media. It also has strong intuitive appeal with the general public. Yet, community policing has encountered significant stumbling blocks at the operational level nearly everywhere it has been tried.

Indeed, not all the anecdotal evidence has been positive. In fact, community policing initiatives have been severely scaled back in two of its most prominent national settings_Houston, Texas, and New York City.

MISTAKES OF THE PAST

After more than a decade of community policing experiments, several major errors become apparent when viewed against the historical context. Perhaps this explains some of the difficulties that have been encountered.

Lack of Planning

Although intended as an overarching philosophy, community policing programs in many cities developed incrementally, determined more by the availability of grant funding and the need to appease certain neighborhood groups than according to any strategic management plan. As professionalism was rushed along pell-mell by technology, so is community policing being pushed forward by the uneven flow of Federal dollars. Significantly, after 50 years of reform, the distribution of police resources appears in danger of being openly repoliticized.

Mission Ambiguity

Like the members of the San Francisco Police Department Community Relations Unit, many practitioners of community policing seem unsure of who to serve and how to serve them. Approaches range from ardent neighborhood advocacy to aggressive street crime suppression. In their confusion, agencies have settled for the superficial program components--police ministations, bicycle patrols, and midnight basketball games--that define community policing in grant applications.

Limited Implementation

As with police-community relations and team policing, cities often

attempt to implement community policing through small, specialized units in well-defined neighborhoods. Unfortunately, this approach often leads to the alienation of some officers and to claims that the police are ignoring other residents. Stalled implementation can aggravate organizational conflict; the perception that community policing officers play by different rules and do not have to answer calls for service angers other officers who believe that they do more work under more difficult conditions. It also can lead to resentment between those neighborhoods that receive the special attention of community policing and those that do not.

Personnel Evaluation

Community policing advocates the evaluation of officers not on traditional indicators of performance, such as calls handled and arrests made, but on more creative, problem-solving efforts. Yet, cities have been slow to change their appraisal systems, most of which still call for traditional, quantifiable performance indicators that are irrelevant, at best, and contradictory with the community policing paradigm, at worst. Similar disparity between the nontraditional behaviors desired by top administrators and the standardized expectations of middle management contributed to the failure of team policing 20 years ago.

Lack of Efficiency

True community policing represents a highly labor-intensive approach. Foot patrol--a key component--was abandoned by prior generations because it was not a cost-effective way to deliver police services. The City of Portland, Oregon, determined that it needed to add 200 officers to its existing force of 750 to implement community policing properly. In the early 1990s, the City of Houston scrapped its equally ambitious plan when budget cutbacks forced it to lay off 655 of its 4,500 officers. The shrinking tax base in cities and public demands for leaner government allow little room for the expansion needed to make community policing effective.

Potential Corruption

Two of the key elements of community policing--decentralization and permanent assignments--conflict with the professional model's prescription for controlling corruption and limiting political influence. Centralized authority was one of the first reforms called for by the IACP a century ago, and the idea of mandatory rotation of assignments followed not long thereafter. An unintended consequence of community policing may be the development of the same close personal and political ties between individual officers and citizens along their beats that historically served as the breeding ground for petty corruption and undermined management's control of the rank and file.

Problems of Evaluation

Finally, in the absence of valid research findings, "community policing is advancing because it seems to make sense, not because it has been shown to be demonstrably superior."5 Just as professionalism appeared to be the "one best way" for half a century, so now is community policing the orthodox doctrine. However, community policing's emphasis on social work conflicts with today's conservative political climate. One of the programs that conservative legislators targeted for elimination in the 1994 crime bill was midnight basketball--a common component of community policing's outreach efforts toward underprivileged youth. Demands for less social work and more crime-fighting seem likely.

The time may have come for defenders of community policing to conduct legitimate program evaluation. Its continued status as the established dogma is now in doubt.

LESSONS OF HISTORY

While administrators can glean much from the specific lessons of history that relate to the evolution of community policing, these lessons should be considered within the context of two somewhat more generally applicable principles. First, the crime problem appears to have changed

little since the Industrial Revolution drove the urbanization of Western culture in the early 1800s. Objective measures of the true prevalence of criminal activity in our cities remain as elusive today as they were when the British Parliament began debating the "Act for Improving the Police In and Near the Metropolis" in the late 1820s.

Similarly, modern surveys of public opinion, like 18th century accounts, still have difficulty "separating fear of crime from disapproval of conduct deemed immoral or alarm at public disorder."6 Nevertheless, descriptions of London's problems early in the last century would sound strikingly familiar to residents of American cities near the end of the 20th century.

Second, organizational change in police agencies has been a constant theme of academicians, policymakers, and practitioners from the very beginning_perhaps only because it is one factor among the many complex issues facing the police over which these groups can exercise some control. However, changes in policing strategies are not always determined through rigorous testing.7 Every new movement in law enforcement--from the establishment of the first organized police forces, to the reforms of the Progressive era, to community policing-- has been touted, with little supporting evidence, as the one true solution to the problem of crime in society. To date, none of them has lived up to such unrealistic expectations.

CONCLUSION

Police administrators should acknowledge that crime is a natural condition of society, not a problem to be solved, so that neither they, their personnel, their political leaders, nor the public will be deluded into unrealistic expectations by new programs. They must recognize that changes in their operations and their organizations are inevitable, but that few--if any--of these changes will be completely unprecedented journeys into uncharted territory.

Administrators should learn the lessons of history--from the conditions that led Sir Robert Peel to introduce the paramilitary structure, to the development of centralized authority, to the limited crime-fighting role advocated by the reformers, to the factors that led to the failure of police-community relations and team policing. Those who learn from history will be better prepared for the leadership challenges in the difficult times ahead.

Endnotes

1 International City Management Association (ICMA), Local Government Police Management, 3d. ed. (Washington, DC: ICMA, 1991), 4.

2 Jerome H. Skolnick, "The Police and the Urban Ghetto," The Ambivalent Force: Perspectives on Police, eds. Arthur Niederhoffer and Abraham S. Blumberg, 2d ed. (Hinsdale, IL: Dryden, 1976), 222.

3 Ibid., 222-223.

4 National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Report on Police (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 1973), 154.

5 Skolnick and Bayley, quoted in Gordon Witkin, "Beyond 'Just the Facts, Ma'am,'" U.S. News & World Report, August 2, 1993, 30.

6 Thomas A. Reppetto, The Blue Parade (New York: Free Press, 1978), 6.
7 Alvin W. Cohn and Emilio C. Viano, Police Community Relations: Images, Roles, Realities (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1976), 3.
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Policing in Canada Today

Prepared by Erica McKim
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Structure of policing in Canada

While the federal government is responsible for the creation of the criminal law, under the <u>Constitution Act</u>, the provinces are responsible for the administration of justice, including policing. Only two provinces, Ontario and Québec, choose to operate their own provincial forces. The others contract with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) to provide policing services.

The RCMP is a federal police force. It is governed by the RCMP Act and has a number of responsibilities:

- Enforcement of federal statutes
- Protection of foreign missions and important Canadian figures
- Contract policing to eight provinces, three territories and about 200 municipalities
- United Nations policing duties abroad
- Provision of a range of operational support services to all police in Canada. Such services include forensic laboratories, police information systems, identification, and advanced police training.

Provincial police acts set out the terms by which police are governed. The acts can require that cities and towns, upon reaching a certain population size, maintain their own police force. Municipalities have three options when providing municipal policing services: form their own police force, join an existing municipal police force, or enter into an agreement with a provincial police force or the RCMP.

At the **municipal level** in 1998, there were 571 municipal police forces in Canada which included 201 RCMP municipal contracts and 29 OPP municipal contracts.

In addition to the municipal, provincial and federal police forces, there are also a number of **First Nations policing agreements** for Aboriginal communities in place across Canada.

Regionalization = restructuring

For many police forces, regionalization is the most cost-effective and efficient way of doing business. Owing to budget cuts and downsizing, creative solutions, like regionalization, have been adopted. For example, at the local level, municipal police forces have joined together with other municipalities and rural areas to create a regional police service. This regional police force offers reduced costs, improved service and centralized administrative services.

These benefits are the same for the RCMP which significantly changed its service delivery model

through regionalization. The purpose of the RCMP's regionalization initiative was to ensure a closer relationship between operational and corporate responsibility, streamline administration, eliminate duplication and improve accountability.

Key government players in policing

Depending on the province, **attorneys general, solicitors general or ministers of justice** develop policy for the direction of policing. They are also responsible for correctional institutions for inmates serving sentences of less than two years, provincial parole systems, and the court system.

The Solicitor General of Canada is responsible for the RCMP, the Canadian Correctional Service, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service and the National Parole Board. The Minister is accountable to Parliament for the effective operation of four Ministry agencies -- the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the Correctional Service, the National Parole Board and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service.

Police powers

Federal police powers

The Royal Canadian Mounted Police enforces federal statues and all laws made by, or under, the authority of the Canadian Parliament.

Provincial police powers:

Provincial police forces enforce the *Criminal Code* and provincial statues within each province or areas that are not served by a municipal police force (i.e. small towns or rural areas).

Municipal Police powers:

Municipal police forces enforce the *Criminal Code*, provincial statues, and municipal by-laws within the specific boundaries of a municipality or within several adjoining municipalities which make up a region (e.g. Durham Regional Police).

Please note: Where a municipal policing contract is granted to a provincial force or to the RCMP, these police agencies automatically assume municipal police powers. As well, where a provincial policing contract is granted to the RCMP, the RCMP automatically assumes provincial policing powers.

Police forces usually follow a specific rank and promotion system. Below is the usual ranking templates for municipal police forces in Canada today. The RCMP and Ontario Provincial Police differ slightly from municipal police agencies. The rank system in Quebec is different again.

The cost of policing

Quick facts about the cost of policing

- Policing expenditures totaled $6.3 billion in 1998
- Municipal policing continues to account for approximately 56% of policing expenditures, provincial policing 23%, and federal and other RCMP costs account for the remaining 21% of

the total expenditures

Where there are municipal and provincial contracts, the municipal and provincial government is responsible for funding their respective police forces. Where RCMP is granted a policing contract to police a municipality, under the billing agreement, municipalities with a population under 15,000 are billed 70% of total expenditures, and municipalities of 15,000 and over are billed 90% of total costs. In the provinces and territories where the RCMP are contracted to provide provincial level policing, the provinces are billed 70% of the total contract costs in most cases. The remaining funds come from the federal government.

Canadian policing statistics

Canadian police officers (1999):

- The number of police officers in Canada in 1999 was **55,300** (personnel counts are based on permanent, full-time equivalents)
- Police strength in Canada (181 officers per 100,000 population) is lower than both the United States (250) and England and Wales (240)
- Yukon had the highest number per 100,000 population (388). In other territories the Northwest Territories (374) and Nunavit (306). Among the provinces Manitoba (191), Saskatchewan (188), Quebec(186) and Ontario(182). Newfoundland (142) and Prince Edward Island (143)had the lowest rates

Female officers (1999):

- The number of women police officers in Canada in 1999 was 7,149, an increase of 7% from 1998
- Women accounted for 13% of police officer positions in Canada in 1999

Aboriginal, visible minority and female officers

Data from the 1996 Census of Population and Housing showed that:

- More than two-thirds of women police officers in Canada were under the age of 35, whereas two-thirds of the men police officers were 35 years and older
- Visible minorities (excluding Aboriginal persons) made up 10% of the employed labour force in Canada, but only 3% of police officers
- Aboriginal persons accounted for nearly 2% of the employed labour force in Canada, but made up 3% of police officers

Statistics from the 1999 Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics report "Police Resources in Canada" (cat# 85-225-XIE) which replaces the CCJS' report "Police Personnel and Expenditures in Canada --1997 and 1998".

Community policing -- today's Canadian policing model

The community policing philosophy means "policing **for and with** communities rather than **of** communities." By actively involving the community in policing matters, police agencies have a better chance of developing successful strategies and problem-solving techniques to effectively combat crime. The community policing model is also the adaptation of modern management principles to police organizations. It involves the flattening of hierarchical organizations and decentralization of authority to the service delivery level.

Today, the community policing philosophy is the standard model of service delivery for most police agencies across Canada. Edmonton Police Service was a pioneer in the field in adopting community policing in 1984. The RCMP officially implemented this community policing philosophy in 1990. Although some argue this community policing model has been in place for centuries in small towns and rural areas across Canada, most agree that community policing in large urban centres only emerged in the 1970s.

Since that time, other police agencies and police associations, including the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police (CACP) and the Canadian Association of Police Boards, have expressed strong support for the community policing philosophy. The 1997 federal Speech from the Throne confirmed that community policing was the policing service delivery of choice by stating: "safe communities -- a hallmark of Canada -- depend on strong crime prevention efforts. There is a growing commitment and belief that effective policing can be achieved only when there is ongoing co-operation and partnership between police and the community."

Department of Justice   Ministère de la Justice
Canada   Canada   Canada

Police Discretion with Young Offenders

IV. Organizational Factors Affecting Police Discretion

7.0 Support for community policing
7.1 The philosophical dimension: mission statements and documented mandates and objectives
7.2 The strategic dimension: policies, protocols, and allocation of resources
7.3 The tactical dimension: crime prevention programs and problem-oriented policing (POP)
7.4 The organizational dimension: organizational redesign

7.0 Support for community policing

One major shift in the orientation of policing in Canada has been the shift from traditional to community policing. By the 1990's, virtually every police force in Canada had incorporated the term 'community policing' in their written mandates (Horne, 1992). This is not to say that every police department in Canada has necessarily adopted the entire philosophy behind community policing. This philosophy of policing entails an expanded role of the police within the community, and significant internal organizational change. There is considerable variation in practices across Canada (Hornick et al., 1996). The variations are not only a question of whether a few new programs were adopted but also one of confusion concerning the application and implementation of the concept of community policing (Horne, 1992; Leighton, 1991). In short, most departments understand *what* community policing is but there is little agreement as to *how* it should be executed (Hornick et al., 1996).

A shift from traditional to community policing involves a change in a department's orientation, emphasis, community relations, geographical organization, power base, and recruitment and training (Wood, 1996). Traditional policing adopts the crime control model as its primary orientation. Community policing incorporates a mixture of order maintenance and community service (Wood, 1996). The responsibility for community relations is on every officer, instead of the traditional approach of specialized units. The emphasis shifts from one of bureaucratic process to concrete results, and the power base shifts from complete police control to a shared power with the community. The jurisdictional organization (discussed in Section 2.0 above), moves from centralized to decentralized. Most importantly, recruitment and training must be geared towards human relations and problem solving instead of an exclusive focus on crime control (Wood, 1996). A problem-oriented policing style adopts methods such as SARA (Scanning Analysis Response Assessment) and CAPRA [80](Clients Analysis Partnerships Response Assessment) (Himelfarb, 1997; Hornick et al., 1996). In both cases, officers incorporate the actions of relevant actors (victims, offenders), consider the characteristics of the incident (social context, physical setting, and actions taken before, during, and after the events) as well as the responses and perceptions of citizens and private/public institutions as they apply to the problem (Bala et al., 1994). Thus, community policing has two major components: (i) community partnerships, and (ii) problem solving (Hornick et al, 1996). Canadian police leaders have strongly endorsed community policing as the most progressive approach (Leighton, 1991); however, the available literature does not identify which Canadian police agencies have made a complete transition to community policing.

In order to adopt a community policing approach, a police department must create its own community policing style, which reflects the needs of the citizens in the communities that it serves. Normandeau & Leighton (1990) have identified the following characteristics as essential for the success of any community policing effort:

- The mission of police officers as peace officers
- Community consultation

- A proactive approach to policing
- A problem-oriented strategy
- Crime prevention activities
- Interagency cooperation
- Interactive policing
- A reduction of the fear of victimization
- Development of police officers as generalists
- Decentralized police management
- Development of flatter organizational structures and accountability to the community.

In short, adoption of the philosophy of community policing involves a radical change in *all elements* of organizational structure and process. Finding viable alternatives to formal processing involves focusing on the causes of the behaviour and using proactive problem solving which finds meaningful responses that are best tailored and balanced to the youth and his or her situation (Hornick et al, 1996). The employment of a multi-agency approach stresses the use of community-level resources, a sharing of knowledge and a pooling of resources and expertise in a cost-effective manner (ibid.). These elements are all facilitated by a complete adoption of community policing philosophy. Thus, the degree to which a police agency adopts community policing is likely to have a profound influence on its use of informal means to handle youth crime.

Since community policing focuses on the needs of a specific community, there is no blanket schematic approach. An approach that works in one jurisdiction may not be applicable in another. Police officers have indicated that they lack general knowledge of what works in given situations. In some jurisdictions, the police are very innovative in their approaches to handling youth crime; whereas, in others they appear overwhelmed with their workload, stating that the YOA inhibits their abilities to develop proactive crime prevention strategies.

A recent study found that police strongly favour community policing objectives and 97% felt that community-based alternatives to formal processing were a viable method to impart meaningful consequences (Caputo & Kelly, 1997). However, drawbacks included a lack of direction and meaning regarding the concept of community policing, variation in the informal nature between jurisdictions, availability, reluctance by administrators to reallocate resources away from traditional reactive policing functions, [81] and a lack of recognition by peers and superiors [82]for crime prevention initiatives such as school-based programming (ibid.). In short, police officers are asking for guidance on how and when to use police discretion within a community policing policy.

7.1 The philosophical dimension: mission statements and documented mandates and objectives

There are four dimensions of community policing: philosophical, strategic, tactical, and organizational (Cordner & Scarborough, 1997). The philosophical aspect involves incorporating community policing ideals (as discussed above) within the organization. The philosophical dimension is commonly found within a mission statement and/or a department's mandates and objectives. Just under one-half (46%) of the police agencies in our sample provided us with a copy of their mission statement, and one-third provided copies of their mandates and objectives. Agencies in metropolitan areas are much more likely to have a mission statement (70%) than those in suburban/exurban (42%) or rural/small town jurisdictions (34%). Documentation of mandates and objectives is less common: 47% of metropolitan police agencies were able to provide this type of documentation, as were 26% of suburban/exurban agencies and 26% of rural and small town agencies.

There are striking regional differences in the availability of documentation (Figure IV.19). Almost all of the police agencies in Ontario and over one-half in the Atlantic currently have mission statements, compared to much lower proportions elsewhere. The great majority of agencies in Ontario (70%) also have clearly stipulated mandates and objectives, compared to lower proportions in the other regions (0% - 27%) [83]. Virtually all of these documents contain the terminology "community policing". However, it is only in the other dimensions that the degree to which an agency has adopted community policing can be identified.

Figure IV.19 Regional distribution of adoption of the philosophical dimension of community policing


Description

7.2 The strategic dimension: policies, protocols, and allocation of resources

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The strategic dimension denotes incorporation of the ideals of community policing into policies and protocols, as well as - crucially - the allocation of adequate resources. There are several aspects that can be examined to assess the degree to which a police agency has adopted the strategic component of community policing. Figure IV.20 shows the percentage of police agencies that provided us with documentation concerning these various aspects.

Figure IV.20: Police services which provided documentation on the strategic dimension of community policing


Description

These percentages provide insight into the extent to which policies and protocols have been adopted. Yet, even within those agencies that have established relevant policies, protocols, and reports to the public (e.g. an Annual Report) the question remains whether they have supported the rhetoric with adequate resources. We asked our interviewees whether they felt that their police agency was supportive of community policing. Answers were coded into three categories. *Not supportive* indicates that the police agency does not have any community policing policy, does not provide resources for officers to implement community policing initiatives, and management does not reward any of these types of initiatives. *Supportive - policy* means that the agency has drafted policies, protocols, and reports to the public that indicate a commitment to community policing (for details, see Figure IV.20 above). Finally, the category *supportive with resources* indicates the allocation of significant resources to community policing. Agencies

in this category have not only written down their initiatives but have also provided adequate resources and support for the implementation and continuation of community policing within all ranks. In a substantial number of police services, officers whom we interviewed disagreed with one another as to the level of support for community policing. These police services were coded *multiple answers*. Figure IV.21 shows the distribution of police services.

Figure IV.21: Level of commitment by police agencies to community policing


Description

The data suggest that less than one-quarter of the police agencies in our sample have implemented the strategic component of community policing. The fact that more than one-third of the agencies fell under the category of *multiple answers* suggests two things to us. First, the philosophical dimension has not been clearly articulated within all ranks to ensure that officers have a clear idea of the mandates and goals with respect to the implementation of community policing. Second, the assignment of dedicated community service officers (CSO's) in some police services increases the likelihood of conflicting views among members of the police agency, since other officers (e.g. patrol) do not see themselves as engaged in community policing per se.

The regional distribution of police agencies' support for community policing is shown in Figure IV.22. [84] The strongest form of commitment to community policing - allocation of significant resources to it - is spread fairly evenly across the regions of Canada, except for the low levels in the Atlantic region and the Territories. Allocation of resources to community policing is more common among metropolitan (42%) and suburban/exurban agencies (40%), but lower, as expected, in rural and small town police agencies (26%).

Figure IV.22 Regional distribution of the level of commitment by police agencies to community policing


Description

Looking at the views of individual officers, rather than treating the police service as a unit, we find that 40% of the respondents said their organization had allocated significant resources to community policing, another 40% said it was supportive in policy only, and 20% said it was not supportive. Many of the officers who said that their organization was supportive in policy only made it very clear that they considered this form of commitment to be "lip service" only, which was not backed up with tangible action. Thus, only 40% of the officers whom we interviewed felt that their organization had made a serious commitment to community policing, in the form of the allocation of resources. This rather undermines the claim at the beginning of this section that Canada has witnessed a major shift from traditional to community policing.

Views of officers concerning their organization's commitment to community policing differ by the functional assignment of the respondent. Figure IV.23 shows that School Liaison Officers and youth squad officers are the most likely to say that their organization is *not* supportive of community policing, but SLO's are also the most likely to say that their agency is supportive with resources. Evidently, they have more clearly defined views than other officers, presumably because it is the SLO's who are most directly involved in community policing. Youth squad officers are also less likely than others to view their organization as supportive with resources; however, it is the patrol officers who take the most jaundiced view of their organization's commitment to community policing: only 13% said there was support including resources.

Figure IV.23 Views on agency's support for community policing, by location of service

Description

Our findings do suggest the implementation of the strategic component of community policing affects police decision-making with young offenders. If an agency has relevant policy and resources dedicated to community policing its members are more likely "usually" or "always" to use informal action. No differences are apparent in the use of informal warnings; however, agencies which are supportive with resources are more likely to use formal warnings (44%) than those that are supportive only with policy (30%) or agencies that are not supportive of community policing (0%). Police agencies which have allocated resources to community policing are also less likely to question a youth at home or the police station as a form of informal action (23% vs. 50% of other agencies). Further, officers in these agencies are almost twice as likely to make referrals to external agencies if the police force is supportive with the allocation of resources (80% versus 44% of other agencies).

The level of commitment to community policing is positively related to the use of alternative measures as a method to deal with youth-related incidents. One-quarter (25%) of agencies that are not supportive of community policing use pre-charge diversion, compared to almost one-half (43%) that have incorporated community policing policy, and three-quarters (75%) of those agencies with dedicated resources. There is a similar relationship with the likelihood that a police agency uses community based pre-charge restorative justice programs. None of the agencies that were not supportive of community policing used community based restorative justice diversion programs, compared to 22% of those with supportive policy and over one-half (56%) with dedicated resources. No differences were evident in the use of post-charge alternative measures.

Table IV.3 shows the proportions of apprehended youth who were charged during 1998-2000, according to the UCR Survey, broken down by the degree of support of the police service for community policing.

The table is further broken down by region, in order to control for overall regional variations in charging practices. In five of the six regions (the Prairie provinces being the exception), the propensity to charge decreases as the level of support for community policing increases.

Table IV.3 Proportion of apprehended young persons charged, 1998-2000, by the level of support for community policing and region

	Not supportive(% charged)	Supportive - policy (% charged)	Supportive with resources (% charged)
Territories	n/a	61%	43%
British Columbia	56%	49%	35%
Prairies	n/a	71%	75%
Ontario	73%	75%	66%
Quebec	n/a	47%	45%
Atlantic	78%	60%	60%

There is no relationship between the level of commitment to community policing and the use of appearance notices or summonses. However, there is a relationship with the reasons which respondents gave us for the use of the promise to appear. Agencies with dedicated community policing resources are more likely to use a promise to appear "to release a young person without detention" (75%) than those agencies that have only policy or are not supportive (53%). They are also more likely to use a PTA "as a higher consequence than releasing with an appearance notice" (18% vs. 0%), or "in conjunction with an OIC undertaking" (64% vs. 25%). There is no relationship between the degree to which an agency has implemented the strategic dimension of community policing, and the types of conditions which its members commonly attach to an OIC undertaking.

With one exception, we found no differences in reasons given to detain a youth for a judicial interim release hearing. Agencies with dedicated community policing resources are only half as likely to indicate that they detain young offenders "for multiple breaches" (19% vs. 41%).

7.3 The tactical dimension: crime prevention programs and problem-oriented policing (POP)

(Top of Page)

The tactical dimension in the implementation of community policing is the establishment "on the ground" of crime prevention programs and problem-oriented policing. We asked respondents about the degree of involvement of their agency in crime prevention, and coded the answers into three categories. *Every* police service and detachment in our sample has one or more crime prevention programs that are delivered on a relatively consistent basis. Officers in 28% of the agencies said that their agency delivers *a lot* of crime prevention programs; 34% of agencies deliver *some* programs, and 38% of agencies have a *little* involvement in delivering crime prevention programs.

Figure IV.24 shows the regional distribution of involvement. This mirrors the regional distribution of levels of youth crime (Figure III.9), with high levels in the Prairies and Territories and lower levels elsewhere.

Figure IV.24 Regional distribution of the level of involvement of police services in crime prevention programs

Description

Metropolitan (33%) and suburban/exurban (29%) police agencies are more likely than agencies in rural areas and small towns (20%) to be involved in "a lot" of crime prevention programs; and agencies in rural areas and small towns are more likely (48%) to have only "a little" involvement in crime prevention than metropolitan (30%) and suburban/exurban agencies (29%). These patterns suggest a relationship between the perceived level of youth crime in the community and the level of involvement of the police service in crime prevention programs. At the high end of the spectrum, however, the relationship is actually very weak: 32% of police services in communities with "a lot" of youth crime are involved in "a lot" of crime prevention programs, versus 26% of services in communities with "a normal amount" of youth crime and 25% of services in communities with "not very much" youth crime. A much stronger relationship is evident at the other end of the continuum of involvement: 67% of police agencies in communities with "not very much" youth crime have only "a little" involvement in crime prevention programs, versus 38% of agencies in communities with "a normal amount" of youth crime, and 18% of agencies in communities with "a lot" of youth crime.

Only 11% of the agencies in the sample provided us with documentation concerning their crime prevention programs - apparently because only the larger agencies have the financial and personnel resources to produce this kind of documentation. A small percentage of agencies provided documentation concerning their specialized programs such as SHOCAP/SHOP (9%), G.R.I.T. (Gang Resistance Intervention Team) (2%), and TAPP-C (5%). 16% of our sample provided documentation outlining community mobilization projects and ongoing problem-oriented initiatives involving community partners. It was evident from the interviews that these figures are not indicative of the extent that the police agencies in our sample are engaged in innovative youth programs, and do not capture the depth of involvement in their communities of many of the agencies in our sample.

There is considerable variation in the type of crime prevention programs in which police services participate. The type of programs delivered may change periodically over the years to better reflect the perceived needs of the community. For example, our interviewees suggested that the prevalence of programs geared towards the prevention of bullying has increased over the past three to four years. Similarly, in many organizations officers are becoming much more involved in volunteer activities that bring them in contact with youth (e.g. baseball games, community events). Figure IV.25 shows the main categories of crime prevention programs which are currently being delivered by agencies in our sample, either in schools or at other venues.

Figure IV.25: Types of crime prevention programs

Description

Figure IV.26 shows the regional distribution of police services involved in crime prevention programs related to youth gangs. Involvement is higher in the Prairies and Ontario, and very low in Quebec and the Atlantic provinces. Except for Quebec, this distribution mirrors the regional distribution of identified youth gang problems: higher levels in the Prairies, Ontario, and Quebec (Figure III.14). Indeed, police agencies in communities with identified youth gang problems are much more likely (52%) to be involved in gang-related programs than other police agencies (10%). Involvement in youth gang-related crime prevention programming is also strongly related to the perceived level of youth crime in the community: 50% of police services in communities with "a lot" of youth crime are involved in anti-gang programs, compared with 14% in communities with "a normal amount" of youth crime, and only 8% in communities with "not very much" youth crime. These relationships probably explain why police services in metropolitan areas are much more likely (40%) to be involved in gang-related programs than agencies in suburban/exurban communities (21%) or police services in rural areas and small towns (7%). Police services in communities with a significant population of aboriginals living off-reserve are also much more likely (31%) to be involved in gang-related programs than other police services (14%). However, there is no relationship between policing a First Nations reserve and being involved in gang-related programs: 19% of police agencies which include a reserve in their jurisdiction are involved in such programs, compared with 20% of other police agencies.

Figure IV.26 Regional distribution of involvement by police agencies in youth gang related crime prevention programs


Description

A somewhat similar pattern can be seen for police involvement in anti-violence programs. The regional distribution of police services involved in such programs is shown in Figure IV.27. It mirrors, approximately, the regional distribution of police services reporting a significant problem of youth violence in their communities, with higher levels in the Prairies and Ontario, and low levels in the Atlantic provinces (Figure III.13). However, police services in the Territories reported relatively low levels of serious youth violent crime (Figure III.13), but are heavily involved in violence-related crime prevention programs. Police involvement in programs related to youth violence is much more prevalent in communities where

police have identified a problem of serious violent youth crime: 79% of police services in such communities are involved in anti-violence programs, compared with 38% of police services in other communities. Similarly, 73% of police services in communities with "a lot" of youth crime are involved in anti-violence programs, compared with 52% in communities with "a normal amount" of youth crime, and 23% in communities with "not very much" youth crime. These relationships probably explain why metropolitan police services are much more likely (70%) to be involved in anti-violence programs than suburban/exurban (42%) or rural and small town police services (36%). There is no relationship between policing aboriginal populations, either on- or off-reserve, and involvement in anti-violence programs, which is a little surprising in view of the problem of violent crime which has been identified in aboriginal communities (Griffiths & Verdun-Jones, 1994: 638-639; cf. Chapter III, Section 4.2.4 above).

Figure IV.27 Regional distribution of involvement by police agencies in youth violence related crime prevention programs

Description

Does the level of involvement in crime prevention programs have an effect on police decision-making with young offenders? The data suggest that this involvement is related to the use of informal action, but that there are no systematic relationships between the level of involvement in crime prevention and the use of pre- and post-charge alternative measures or the methods used to compel attendance at court.

As the level of involvement by a police agency in crime prevention programs increases, the likelihood that officers "usually" or "always" consider using informal action also rises. 93% of the agencies with "a lot" of crime prevention programs "usually" or "always" consider informal action with youth-related incidents compared to 80% of those with "some" involvement and 66% of those with "a little" involvement. The same pattern occurs for the use of informal warnings: 100% of the agencies with "a lot" of involvement in crime prevention programs use informal warnings compared to 94% of those with "some" involvement and 89% of those agencies with "a little" involvement. Officers are almost twice as likely (50%) to use formal warnings in agencies with "a lot" of involvement in crime prevention as officers in those with "some" or "a little" involvement (26%). Similarly, if there is "a lot" of (100%) or "some" (97%) involvement, officers are more likely to use parental involvement as a form of informal action than officers in agencies with only "a little" involvement in crime prevention programs (80%). Further, the likelihood that officers will make referrals to external agencies is also higher in agencies with "a lot" of involvement in crime prevention (75%) than in those with "some" (61%) or "a little" involvement (52%). Not surprisingly, officers are more likely to say that they "almost always" use informal action with minor (22% vs. 10%) and provincial offences (24% vs. 12%) in agencies with "a lot" of involvement in crime prevention programs than in agencies with less involvement.

The more involved a police agency is in delivering crime prevention programs, the less likely its members are to "almost always" charge for minor or for serious offences. Agencies which are involved in "a lot" of or "some" programs are less likely to charge for minor offences (2%) than those with only "a little" involvement in crime prevention programs (14%). Similarly, agencies with "a lot" of or "some" crime prevention programs are less likely to "almost always" charge in serious offences (39%, compared with 61% of agencies with only "a little" involvement).

Table IV.4 shows percentages of apprehended youth who were charged in 1998-2000, according to the UCR Survey, broken down by the level of involvement of police services in crime prevention initiatives.

The percentages are also broken down by the level of crime in the community, to control for the confounding effect of that variable. Since levels of charging vary substantially by province, it is also desirable to control for the individual province, but that was impossible, due to the small numbers of police services in the resulting cross-classification. The solution which we adopted was to calculate, for each police service, the percentage of apprehended youth who were charged, relative to the provincial average. For example, in British Columbia, the overall percentage of apprehended youth who were charged during 1998-2000 (in our sample) is 56% (Table II.1). Thus, if a police service in British Columbia charged 70% of apprehended youth, it would receive a score of +14%; if it charged 60% of apprehended youth, it would be scored as -10%.

Table IV.4 Proportion of apprehended young persons charged, 1998-2000, relative to the overall provincial level of charging, by the level of involvement of police in crime prevention initiatives, and by the perceived level of youth crime in the community

	Level of involvement in crime prevention		
	"A little"	**"Some"**	**"A lot"**
Perceived level of youth crime in the community	% charged	% charged	% charged
"Not very much"	-1%	n/a	+5%
"A normal amount"	±0%	-4%	-5%
"A lot"	+4%	+2%	-6%

Thus, in Table IV.4, in communities with "not very much" perceived youth crime, police services with only a little involvement in crime prevention initiatives have a rate of charging apprehended youth which is slightly (1%) below the provincial average, and those which are involved in "a lot" of initiatives have an average level of charging which is 5% above the provincial average. [85] This suggests that, in this type of community, involvement in crime prevention initiatives is associated with an *increase* in the propensity to charge, contrary to expectations. In communities with "a normal amount" of youth crime, police services with "a lot" of involvement have an average level of charging which is 5% below that of services with "a little" involvement; and in communities with "a lot" of youth crime, agencies with "a lot" of involvement have, on average, a level of charging which is 10% lower than those with "a little" involvement. Thus, the relationship between the level of involvement in crime prevention initiatives and the level of charging of apprehended youth becomes greater as the perceived amount of youth crime in the community increases.

We also asked respondents about the use of problem-oriented policing (POP) in their police service or detachment. When discussing problem-oriented policing, we were told by some officers that it is an outdated concept. Some of the alternatives they suggested are "solution-oriented policing" or "intelligence-led policing". One officer suggested that "policing has changed from enforcement, to POP, now to community-based policing". We were able to obtain information about the use of POP from 85 of the 92 police services and detachments in the sample. The answers were coded into four categories. *Front-line only* refers to those agencies where front-line officers are the only individuals who actively employ the POP model in the everyday execution of their duties. *Community policing officer only* refers to those agencies in which, when respondents were asked about POP projects, they either referred us to the CSO or indicated that only the CSO is actively involved in using the POP model on a day-to-day basis. *Front-line and Community policing officer only* refers to agencies where all front-line and the community policing officer(s) are utilizing the POP model regularly. Finally, *all ranks* refers to agencies where front-line personnel, community policing officers, GIS, and management are all involved in POP to some degree. The sample is fairly evenly divided among the four categories (Figure IV.28).

Figure IV.28: Type of involvement in problem-oriented policing

Description

Figure IV.29 Regional distribution of the extent of adoption of the POP model

Description

Figure IV.29 shows the regional distribution of the extent of use of the POP model by police services. In order to simplify the presentation, we have combined the categories "Front-line and Community policing officer" and "all ranks" to identify police services in which the use of the POP model is fairly widespread throughout the organization. Evidently, adoption of the POP model is well advanced in the Prairies, and not in the Territories or Atlantic provinces. Using the same combined grouping of police services, in which the POP model is used by all ranks or at least by front-line and CSO officers, we find that suburban/exurban police services are the most likely (65%) to have reached this level of adoption of POP, compared with metropolitan (54%) and rural and small town agencies (32%).

Police officers are more likely to "usually" or "always" consider informal action in agencies where the front-line officers actively incorporate POP into their everyday enforcement activities. In 92% of agencies where the use of POP is restricted to front-line officers, the use of informal action is "usually" or "always" considered, compared with 78% of those where both CSO's and front-line officers use POP, 77% of those in which all ranks use POP, and 74% of agencies where its use is restricted to the CSO's. Similarly, if front-line officers are the only agents active in applying the POP model, they are also more likely to "almost always" consider informal action with minor (32% vs. 11% of agencies with the other 3 models) and provincial offences (29% vs. 13% of other agencies). They are also more likely to "almost always" consider informal action for all offence types (45%) than those agencies where only a CSO uses POP (40%), front-line and CSO's (31%), or all ranks (26%). This suggests that POP has more impact when it is used by front-line officers at the street level than in connection with specifically targeted community projects.

The relationship between the extent of an agency's use of POP and its use of informal action (above) is reversed when we examine differences in the use of pre-charge alternative measures. Agencies whose front-line officers are the only officers applying the POP model are *less* likely to use pre-charge diversion (36%) than agencies in which only CSO's use POP (55%), front-line and CSO's use POP (50%), or

agencies where all ranks are involved in using POP (59%). Once again, this suggests the relevance to diversion and referral decisions of the relationship between the police service and the community, as indicated by the involvement of CSO's and other ranks, in contrast to the predominant role of front-line offices in decisions concerning informal action.

Table IV.5 shows the relationship between the police service's adoption of POP and the proportion of apprehended youth which were charged during 1998-2000, according to the UCR Survey. As in Table IV.4, percentages are relative to the average provincial percentage charged. Police services in which POP is used by all ranks have a level of charging of apprehended youth which is, on average, 4% below their provincial averages; however, those in which POP is used by front-line officers only, or by front-line officers and CSO's have levels of charging which are *higher* than their provincial averages. Applying controls for the level of youth crime in the community, etc., did not change the relationship. We speculate that this unexpected result is due to the inability to differentiate informal action from pre-charge diversion using UCR data. We noted above that agencies whose front-line officers are the only officers applying the POP model are less likely to use pre-charge diversion; presumably this more than offsets the hypothesized increase in the use of informal action by these agencies.

Table IV.5 Proportion of apprehended young persons charged, 1998-2000, relative to the overall provincial level of charging, by the extent of adoption of the POP model

Extent of adoption of POP	% charged
Front-line only	+4%
CSO's only	-9%
Front-line and CSO's	+3%
All ranks	-4%

7.4 The organizational dimension: organizational redesign

(Top of Page)

Finally, the organizational dimension involves a restructuring of the organization to implement community policing. This in turn requires a philosophical reorientation which is easier to state than to describe. Many organizations have flattened their rank hierarchy, implemented new promotion evaluation criteria, and dedicated officers to focus solely on community policing issues. In our discussions with police officers we came to realize that the organizational dimension of community policing is much more complex than the others, and perhaps the most problematic to implement. Organizational redesign requires that management consult with all ranks in order to implement community policing in a manner which best suits the particular community. In several cases, police agencies had implemented most of the components of the philosophical, tactical, and strategic dimensions but had not (yet) revamped the organization or its underlying philosophy to deliver community policing effectively. Organizational redesign presupposes a genuine commitment to community policing on the part of the senior management team, which is then translated into a wide range of organizational innovations. We judged that to measure the extent to which this had happened in our sample of police services was beyond the capabilities of our chosen methodology.

[80] CAPRA, as a problem solving method, is part of every RCMP officer's initial training program (Hornick et al., 1996)
[81] This may be facilitated in agencies which have redefined police roles and job descriptions.
[82] Common indicators of productivity for police officers are arrest and clearance rates (Ericson, 1982).
[83] These stark differences are probably the result of Ontario's Policing Standards Act.
[84] The substantial number of police services in which officers disagreed about the level of support - coded "multiple answers" in Figure IV.21 - are omitted from the percentages in Figure IV.22.
[85] There were too few agencies in the "some involvement" category to calculate a reliable percentage.

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COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION AND COMMUNITY POLICING

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COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION AND COMMUNITY POLICING

This paper examines the role of the public in community policing. Every definition of community policing shares the idea that the police and the community must work together to define and develop solutions to problems (Sadd and Grinc, 1994). One rationale for public involvement is the belief that police alone can neither create nor maintain safe communities. They can help by setting in motion voluntary local efforts to prevent disorder and crime; in this role, they are adjuncts to community crime prevention efforts such as neighborhood watch, target hardening, and youth and economic development programs. A common justification for diverting resources from responding to 911 calls is that community policing will ultimately prevent problems from occurring in the first place, and that many which still do will be dealt with locally without police assistance, or by agencies other than the police (Trojanowicz, 1986).

Community involvement is also frequently justified by pointing to the growing customer orientation of public service agencies, and to the political and social forces lying behind it. It is argued that by opening themselves to citizen input the police will become more knowledgeable about, and responsive to, the varying concerns of different communities. One strand of this argument is that police have "over-professionalized" themselves and their mission, and as a result systematically overlook many pressing community concerns because they lie outside of their narrowly defined mandate (Skogan, 1990). Because these concerns (which can range from public drinking to building abandonment) frequently have deleterious consequences for the communities involved, expanding the scope of the police mandate by making them more "market driven" helps the state be more effective at its most fundamental task, maintaining order.

However, in an environment dominated by skepticism about the ability of police departments to actually implement serious community policing efforts it is easy to underestimate how difficult it can be to build effective community commitment as well. In a recent evaluation of community policing programs in eight cities, the Vera Institute found that all of them experienced great difficulty in establishing a solid relationship between the programs and neighborhood residents (Grinc, 1994; Sadd and Grinc, 1994). Efforts to do so floundered in part on decades of built-up hostility between residents of poor or minority communities and the police. Distrust and fear of the police were rampant in many of the neighborhoods where community policing was instituted. Residents' fear of retaliation from drug dealers further stifled participation in public events. The evaluators concluded that the assumption that residents <u>want</u> closer contact with the police, and want to work with them, is "untested."

It is also uncertain that rank and file officers involved in these programs are any more enthusiastic, especially at the outset. Our surveys of officers involved in Chicago's community policing program found that they were resistant to letting citizens "set their agenda." For example, 72 percent of them were pessimistic about "unreasonable demands on police by community groups" under CAPS (Skogan, 1994). Police in Chicago were often cynical about who would participate in the program, fearing that "loudmouths" and "gimmie-guys" would dominate the proceedings and use the program to advance their own personal and political agendas. Behind the scenes they were nervous about how they would be greeted and treated at public meetings. At the outset, police often defined the public's appropriate role in community policing in the most narrow and traditional terms, as their "eyes and ears."

Another difficulty is that programs which rely on citizen initiative and self-help can be regressive rather than progressive in their impact. Often it is home

owning, long-term residents of a community who learn about and participate more readily in voluntary programs. My evaluation of community policing in Houston (Skogan, 1990) found strong evidence for this. In several experimental districts, community policing efforts were much more visible among whites than among blacks or Hispanics, and they were more likely to become involved. Analysis of the impact of the program indicated that its positive effects were confined to whites, while the lives of other residents of the heterogeneous program areas were unaffected. There seemed to be two reasons for this. First, better-organized whites were poised to take advantage of the resources that the program brought to their neighborhoods. Second, the management of the program allowed officers to pick and choose their target populations. They naturally focused their efforts in places where they felt most welcome, and where their initial efforts seemed to be most effective.

It is also clearly possible to conduct "problem solving policing" without widespread citizen participation, or even much public input. Several of the examples of problem solving documented in Newport News involved police analyses of calls-for-service and crime incident data, and data from other public agencies. The department's operating Task Force and Problem Analysis Advisory Committee were both made up just of police officers (Eck and Spelman, 1987). Newport News developed the "SARA" process for problem identification and problem solving for its own, internal consumption.

Murphy (1993) argues that the Canadian approach to community policing has been particularly conservative in this regard as well. He notes (p, 20-21), "... the community is viewed as a resource, a support group and an information source rather than as an authoritative body." In Canada, community policing remains police-managed, and seldom involves civilians in policy or accountability issues. For example, Edmonton relies on foot constables to gather community input

through their day-to-day contact with area residents and merchants (Hornick, et al, 1993). In Victoria, the principle role for civilians was to serve as staff volunteers in a store-front police office (Walker, et al, 1993). Leighton (1993) describes the appearance of "community consultative committees" in several cities, and indicates they are still finding a role for themselves in advising police operations. In contrast, Chicago's community policing effort provides a structured avenue for citizen participation in problem identification and priority setting, and creates a channel through which community residents can demand some measure of accountability for police performance in their area.

The Chicago Evaluation

This paper examines the role of citizen participation in a new community policing program. It focuses on two roughly comparable police districts, and contrasts what happened there to changes in matched comparison areas that represent "what would have happened" if there had been no program. The data are drawn from an on-going evaluation of the adoption of community policing by the City of Chicago (Skogan, et al, 1994). While the new model of policing that is being crafted by the Chicago Police Department (CPD) is multi-faceted, at its core lies the (anticipated) formation of police-community partnerships focused on problem identification and problem solving at the neighborhood level. The agency's mission statement notes, "... the Department and the rest of the community must establish new ways of actually working together. New methods must be put in place to jointly identify problems, propose solutions, and implement changes. The Department's ultimate goal should be community empowerment" (Chicago Police Department, 1994: 16). Behind the lines, the agency seems driven by two concerns: to increase the effectiveness of the patrol force by targeting issues of public concern, and healing the yawning breach which has opened between the police and racial and ethnic minorities in the community.

The first 14 months of the program provide a laboratory for examining the role of the public in community policing. While it is too soon to determine if the public has indeed been "empowered" by the program, there is now some evidence concerning patterns of program awareness and participation in several experimental police districts.

The Program to Date

Beginning in May, 1993, Chicago's community policing program (dubbed "CAPS," for Chicago's Alternative Policing Strategy) has been tested in five police districts. In those areas, patrol officers were divided on a rotating basis into beat teams and rapid response units. Tasks were assigned so that beat team members would have sufficient free time to attend meetings and work with community members. An average of 45 extra officers (an increment of about 12 percent) were assigned to each district, so that commanders had the personnel they needed to attend to both beat and rapid response needs. Other units were decentralized, so that local commanders had control over various plain-cloths tactical units and youth officers and could integrate their efforts with plans being developed at the grassroots level. The department launched a massive training effort to ensure that officers and their immediate supervisors understand the new roles and responsibilities that they are being called upon to adopt. In recognition that problem-solving policing needs the support of a wide range of agencies, an effort was made to rationalize the delivery of city services by linking them to service requests generated via beat teams.

Beat Meetings

One of the most visible components of the new CAPS structure is the beat meeting. Beats are the smallest geographical unit of police organization in Chicago. The city's 25 Police Districts are divided into 279 beats, or about 12 per area. At the median, a beat in the five prototype areas covers 48 city blocks and includes about 9,000 people and 3,000 households. Before CAPS, officers were not regularly

assigned to work in small areas; the bulk of police work in the districts was done by pairs of officers responding to 911 calls, driving anywhere in (and sometimes out of) their assigned District. The CAPS model of policing, on the other hand, is turf based. Beat teams are assigned to their job for a year. The prototype districts were staffed to allow beat officers to stay on their beat about 70 percent of the time, handing selected classes of routine calls as well as doing less traditional work.

Beat meetings are regular gatherings of small groups of residents and police. The meetings are open to the public, and for the period considered here, most beats met once a month. In each of the two prototype police districts that will be examined below there were approximately 135 beat meetings — one per beat, per month — during the evaluation period. These gatherings were held in church basements, meeting rooms in park buildings, and school rooms throughout the districts. The principal function of beat meetings is to be the forum for the development of joint police-citizen plans to tackle neighborhood problems. The vision driving the program entails the formation of "partnerships" between the police and the public, in both identifying, prioritizing, and solving those problems. The program calls for police to become proactive problem seekers, along with their civilian partners. They are to work together to prevent crime, rather than just continuing to respond to an endless stream of seemingly disconnected incidents (Goldstein, 1990).

To this end, police and residents are supposed to meet one another at the beat meetings, so that civilians will know who is working in their area and police will learn who the "good people" are in their area. To facilitate this, officers who serve on beat teams from all three working shifts are assigned to be present at each meeting, along with a sergeant who supervises activities on the beat, gang and tactical unit officers, and other officers from the Neighborhood Relations unit. In one of the prototype areas considered here, meeting logs compiled by the

department indicate that an average of seven officers attended each meeting. At least one representative of a city service agency was usually also present, and someone representing a local community organization made a statement at about one-half of the meetings.

Beat meetings are also supposed to lead to the exchange of information between police and the public. Over time, we observed that police increasingly brought with them district and crime maps, lists of offenses and arrests, and other information. For their part, residents were rarely reticent to bring up specific problems or problem areas. Beat meetings are intended to break barriers of distrust between residents and the police. Officers initially objected to working with people who came to meetings because they perceived that they would be somehow "unrepresentative" of the community. We observed that over time some of the initial fears that police brought to them — that the meetings would be dominated by "loud mouths," and that the officers present would be "put on the hot seat" as charges against the police were hurled around the room — were not founded. What they encountered were, by and large, reasonable and concerned people who applauded when they stood to be introduced. Officers also seemed to overcome their initial fear they would not be good public speakers, for speeches were rarely called for.

On both CAPS areas there were extensive efforts to advertise beat meetings, and to turn out residents in large numbers. Community newspapers printed beat meeting schedules. Activists posted announcements and shoved flyers into people's mail boxes. In a related study, we identified 250 neighborhood organizations active in the five CAPS prototype areas and interviewed two informants each about their organization's activities. Ninety organizations were studied in the two prototype districts examined here: 58 of them were active in Rogers Park, and 45 in Morgan Park. Table 1 indicates the percentage of those

organizations who were involved in each of a checklist of efforts to mobilize their communities around CAPS. Encouraging people to attend beat meetings and sending representatives to them was nearly ubiquitous. A large majority of these groups were involved in advertising CAPS-related activities. A majority even held their own public meetings about the program, and as will be detailed below, community groups played an important role in hosting and running them as well.

Table 1
Organizational Efforts Surrounding CAPS Meetings

Organizational Activity	Morgan Park	Rogers Park
holding general, public meetings related to CAPS	53%	57%
distributing newsletters or flyers related to CAPS	64	66
encouraging people to attend CAPS-related meetings	87	83
sending representatives to CAPS-related meetings	89	90
Number of organizations	(45)	(58)

While it hard to judge what a "good" attendance figure would be, police department logs for Morgan Park indicate that an average of 35 people attended each beat meeting in that district. In a survey conducted 14 months after the program began we asked respondents who had attended a meeting how many people typically came; their average estimate was similar, 31 in Morgan Park, and 30 in Rogers Park. A plot of the over-time data on beat meeting attendance in Morgan Park indicates that it was seasonal, low in January and February.

Data and Research Design

To gauge public opinion on the eve of the new program, survey interviews were conducted with residents of the prototype districts and matched neighborhoods that serve as comparison areas for the evaluation. The interviews were conducted

by telephone, using a combination of listed directory and randomly generated telephone numbers. The first round of interviews was completed before the program began. In June, 1994, respondents in two of the prototype districts and their comparison areas were reinterviewed, in order to assess changes in levels of program awareness and contact during the first 14 months of the program. Residents of the remaining prototype and comparison areas were reinterviewed later.

The two prototype areas were both diverse. Morgan Park (District 22) residents were 60 percent African-American, and 80 percent were home owners. Nine percent of households there fell below the poverty line, and 62 percent of residents had lived in the community more than 10 years. Rogers Park (District 24) residents were 58 percent white, 17 percent African-American, and 14 percent Hispanic. About 16 percent of households were below the poverty line, and only 24 percent of residents had lived there more than a decade.

Opportunities for Participation

Potentially, one of the most important aspects of CAPS is that it created new opportunities for participation in anti-crime efforts that were relatively uniform across the city. This is quite unlike the distribution of autonomously created and independently active groups. Research on the social and geographic distribution of opportunities to participate in organized group activity indicates that they are least common where they appear to be most needed — in low-income, heterogeneous, deteriorated, high turn-over areas. Ironically, community organizations focusing on crime issues are more common in better-off neighborhoods, while poorer areas characterized by high levels of fear, fatalism, mutual distrust, and despair are less well served.

This is important because individuals participate within a neighborhood contact that defines the alternatives open to them. With the exception of those few

entrepreneurs who create new organizations, people can participate only by affiliating with active groups. Who participates and in what capacity thus turns on what opportunities for participation are available — which varies from place to place. By creating relatively uniform opportunities for participation, CAPS went one step down the road toward mobilizing wider participation among all segments of the community.

The first question is, then, Did the program indeed create new opportunities for citizen participation? If there was little awareness of the new program or knowledge of how to participate, the impact of all of the effort surrounding the inauguration of beat meetings in the prototype districts would be severely muted. To examine this, respondents were asked two questions in sequence that probed their awareness of neighborhood opportunities to participate:

> *During the past year, have you heard about efforts to get community meetings started up in your neighborhood?*
>
> *During the past year, have there actually been any community meetings held here in your neighborhood to try to deal with crime problems?*

These questions gave respondents two opportunities to recall instances of organizational efforts in their community; we did not ask specifically about "beat meetings" because that term was unlikely to be recognized by people who did not attend any meetings, which was most respondents. Responses to these two questions were combined to identify the extent of awareness of organizing efforts in the program and comparison areas. Changes in levels of program awareness in the prototype and comparison areas between 1993 and 1994 provide evidence about the impact of the program.

Figure 1 illustrates the extent of this impact. In both prototype areas, awareness of organized activity increased during the 14 months between the

surveys, and both changes were significant. Awareness of opportunities to participate actually declined in the Morgan Park comparison area, and they did not change significantly in the Rogers Park control area. Likewise, awareness of opportunities to participate did not change for city residents as a whole, as gauged by city-wide surveys.

Although still significant, the magnitude of the program versus comparison group differences depicted in Figure 1 probably were muted by the sheer level of pre-existing organized activism in Chicago. It is highly neighborhood-oriented city with strong local political organizations, decentralized municipal services, and a long tradition of achieving community goals through turf-based organizing. As a result, even before the program began, levels of awareness of opportunities for participation were already very high. This imposed a "ceiling" on potential program effects against which even the most effective program must bump.

Who got the message?

Not surprisingly, awareness of opportunities to participate in community policing was not evenly distributed in the population. In fact, it very much resembled the findings of past research on the distribution of opportunities to participate. By the time of our second survey, stable, family-oriented people with investments in the community were more likely to have gotten the message. While patterns of awareness varied a bit by area, program awareness in the prototypes was more extensive among higher-income, more highly educated people, middle aged married couples, home owners, and whites. Awareness was higher in households that were heavily networked with others in the community. Compared to those who had not heard about community organizing efforts in their area, those who had were already (measured at Wave I) more concerned about crime, physical decay, and disruption in the schools serving their neighborhood. People with past victimization experience also were more likely to have heard about

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organizing efforts. The impact of many of these factors on program awareness is illustrated in Figure 2.

Patterns of Participation

The next question is, Who took advantage of these new opportunities to participate? Two issues are involved in that question. The first is levels of participation. That is, Did more people participate following the onset of CAPS, taking advantage of the regular, visible opportunities for participation that it created? The second, and perhaps more important, issue is that of the distribution of participation. Inevitably, relatively few residents will ever be directly involved in community policing, even to the level of just attending a public meeting. In our view, more important questions are, Are the processes of public involvement broadly inclusive? Are all of the interests and issues facing the community being represented? In particular, we are interested in whether participation followed familiar patterns, encouraging yet higher levels of activism among better off people who already dominated organized community life. Or, was participation in some fashion redistributive; that is, did CAPS bring in "new blood" that along important dimensions represented new and less enfranchised elements of the community? We have already seen that awareness of the opportunities to participate that CAPS provided were more distributive than redistributive, calling for a close look at the data concerning this issue.

The issue of levels of participation is addressed in Figure 3. It illustrates the results of before-and-after surveys of residents of the prototype and comparison areas. If respondents indicated that they had heard of organized group efforts in their neighborhood, they were asked, *Were you able to attend any of the meetings?* Figure 3 classifies each respondent as a participant or non-participant (those who had never heard of meetings were non-participants), and charts the percentage of respondents in each evaluation area who fell in the former category.

None of the before-after differences in levels of participation depicted in Figure 3 are statistically significant. In Morgan Park, participation rose an insignificant one percentage point, and in Rogers park it stood rock-steady. The slight declines in participation in the two comparison areas were not significant, in light of the sample sizes involved. More elaborate analyses that pooled program and comparison areas and controlled for the effects of individual-level demographic factors such as sex, age, and length of residence before looking for effects attributable to the program did not change this picture at all.

However, it was still possible that extensive outreach and organizing efforts in the prototype areas changed the character of participation. CAPS may not have had to rely so heavily on "self-starters," given the broad opportunities for participation created by the program and the extensive effort that went into generating participation in beat meetings. Unlike many past efforts at local organizing, the structure imposed by CAPS ensured that meetings were held on a regular basis in every beat, not just in places that had the resources to sponsor them, or where initial organizing efforts were well received. As Table 1 above indicated, considerable effort was also put into generating participation in beat meetings, by many organizations in each of these relatively small areas. In Morgan Park, a large and powerful community organization representing white home owners in one part of the district extended their franchise to cover the entire district, and put their considerable resources and political influence into generating participation in meetings all over the area. Another powerful organization serving the southern end of Rogers Park hired a professional community organizer to generate attendance and nurture the program in their service area. The most intensive organizational efforts in Rogers Park were in its higher-crime beats, which are diverse and feisty neighborhoods.

In both Morgan Park and Rogers Park, our evaluation indeed found some evidence that both program awareness and actual participation was mildly redistributive in character. That is, new elements in the community were mobilized as a result of CAPS.

To examine this it was necessary to distinguish between two groups of activists: those who at Wave II were involved in organized community efforts for the first time ("new blood") and those who had been involved in community affairs before the onset of CAPS and continued to be aware and active after it came to their district ("retreads"). At the time they were reinterviewed, about 68 percent of residents in Morgan Park and Rogers Park who were aware of opportunities to participate in their area were retreads, while the remaining third were newly informed. Among participants, those in Morgan Park split about 50-50, while about 70 percent of participants from Rogers Park were experienced activists and 30 percent were new to the scene.

Retreads and newly informed or involved area residents differed on several important dimensions. The first of these is illustrated in Figure 4. It depicts the percentage of retreads and new blood in June, 1994, who were either black, Hispanic, or of another race ("percent nonwhite"). It compares respondents drawn from the prototype and comparison areas, to examine the potential impact of CAPS on the breadth of community mobilization. All prototype and comparison-area respondents are grouped together because of the smaller sample sizes involved in this detailed analysis, but the trends described here were at work in each experimental and control area. As Figure 4 suggests, differences in the racial composition of the two groups were large (and statistically significant) in the prototype areas, and small (and insignificant) in the comparison areas.

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Table 2
Demographics of Awareness and Participation
by New and Continuing Status

Demographics of New and Continuing Involvement	Awareness Proto Control		Participation Proto Control	
Percent Nonwhite				
retreads	33%	22%	26%	29%
new blood	54	28	55	29
(p)	(.01)	(.46)	(.01)	(.99)
Percent Non-college				
retreads	48	69	48	67
new blood	53	44	70	52
(p)	(.58)	(.01)	(.05)	(.36)
Percent Own Home				
retreads	76	78	69	81
new blood	64	51	81	76
(p)	(.06)	(.01)	(.21)	(.72)
Percent Female				
retreads	62	67	48	62
new blood	54	56	76	76
(p)	(.29)	(.24)	(.01)	(.33)
Number of Cases				
retreads	229	121	42	21
new blood	61	39	33	21

The same pattern can be observed for other key demographic factors, some of which are detailed in Table 2. Relative to events in the comparison areas, it appears that CAPS beat meetings expanded involvement for women, nonwhites, and those nearer

the bottom of the educational ladder (here presented as the percent who did not go to college, a significant general predictor of awareness and participation). One important factor which did not appear to change as a result of this apparent expansion in the participation base for the program was home ownership. In the prototypes, slightly _more_ new participants than old were home owners.

Did new participants differ in significant ways in terms of the kinds of concerns they brought to the meetings? The survey included questions measuring three different views of the police. One set of ten questions tapped respondents views of the quality of police service; three others asked about police aggressiveness on the street and their use of excessive force; and two judged respondent's optimism about the future of policing in Chicago. None of these attitudes varied significantly with participation status. Similarly, new participants were neither more nor less fearful of crime, nor more or less concerned about crime or neighborhood decay. In terms of their views of the neighborhood, they closely resembled those who were already involved in anti-crime efforts. Both groups differed more from non-participants; those who were not involved perceived less crime and neighborhood decay, and were less positive about the future of policing in Chicago, than participants of any stripe.

Effectiveness of Participation

Has anything come of beat meetings? In our report on the first year of the program we were fairly critical of the beat meeting process. In important ways what happened there did not fit a community policing model. Meetings that we observed were frequently run by community relations specialists, and did not actively involve beat officers. They frequently sat mute in the back, unless called upon. Too often the exchange between residents and the police was one-sided; the former would bring up a long list of specific complaints, and the latter said they "would check on it." Everyone involved still had a narrow, crime-related view of what kinds of problems were suitable for discussion at the meetings, and they all took a traditional, enforcement oriented view of what appropriate solutions for these problems might look like.

However, our survey respondents took a much more sanguine view of the meetings. If they indicated they had attended a meeting, they were asked a series of

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questions about what typically happened there (we asked them to typify meetings because they went to an average of 3.8 meetings apiece). Their responses were similar enough across the two districts to combine them. They reported that someone from the community or a community organizer had conducted two-thirds of the meetings, and that the police had run only 21 percent on their own. Seventy percent thought that the meeting itself has been arranged by a community group, 17 percent thought that police had jointly sponsored the meeting with a group, and only 10 percent thought police organized the meeting on their own. Fully 86 percent of those who went to a meeting indicated that they had learned something at the meeting, and 71 percent reported that action was taken or something happened in their neighborhood as a result of the meeting. When asked how useful these meetings were "... for finding solutions to neighborhood problems," 38 percent said they were very useful, 53 percent somewhat useful, and only 9 percent not useful. Half thought the meetings were very useful "... for improving the community's relationship with the police," and another 42 percent thought they were somewhat useful in this regard.

Other Vehicles for Participation

It is important to note that beat meetings are not the only vehicle for public participation in CAPS. Another is the Advisory Committees that have been established in each district to advise the District Commander. Advisory Committees typically involve 15-20 civilians. They are named by the District Commander, and are to include area residents, local merchants, religious leaders, and representatives of civic associations. We have observed all of the District Advisory Committee meetings in the five prototypes, but can only report now that their efforts have been highly variable. Participation has ranged from highly inclusive to closed and exclusionary. Some Committees have close links with beat-level activists, while others are fairly disconnected from events at that level. Some Committees have

focused on broad social issues important to the community, while others have focused on internal organizational processes. Some view themselves as a support group for their District Commander, while others are viewed by commanders as contending with them for control of operational policies in the district. No single model of how these committees should be organized has yet to emerge from this stew.

On instruction from City Hall, each District Advisory Committee has also formed a Court Advocacy program. Residents are encouraged to attend selected criminal and civil cases to show solidarity with officers and impress judges and prosecutors with their firmness of purpose.

Community members have also been involved at the city-wide level, agitating on behalf of the program and pressuring its administrators to hew closely to their commitment to keep the public informed and involved. To date, city-wide organizations have been concerned about police performance measures, their accountability to the public, the extent to which beat teams have actually been freed from responding to 911 calls, and the openness of beat officers to information sharing and cooperation in problem solving. They are convinced that the program cannot work unless the community "comes to the table" as a powerful, informed, and competent partner, rather than as a supplicant (Friedman, 1994). For example, with a $4 million contract from the City, one of them is organizing a series of beat-level training sessions that will prepare both police and neighborhood residents to be more effective problem solving partners.

CONCLUSION

Chicago's new community policing program provides an opportunity to examine a fledgling effort to involve the public in joint police-citizen efforts at preventing crime and responding to neighborhood decay. Structural changes were made in police task organization to facilitate this new model of policing, and the

program was linked to the improved management of a broad range of city services. The principle mechanism for coordinating this effort with the public is beat-level public meetings that are to provide police and citizens an opportunity to identify, prioritize, and discuss solutions to a broad range of neighborhood problems.

This paper has examined some aspects of the success of this effort. It found that awareness of the opportunities for participation that the program provided was widespread, and was significantly higher in the prototype districts than in the evaluation's comparison areas 14 months after the onset of the program. Levels of organized participation were not significantly higher in the program areas than in the comparison areas. However, there was some evidence that both awareness and participation were more widely distributed within the prototype areas, perhaps as a result of the uniform nature of the opportunities for participation created by CAPS beat meetings and extensive efforts by groups and organizations to stimulate participation in the meetings.

The last finding is important because it was not necessarily so. As noted above, Houston's experience illustrated how merely making opportunities available for informal contact with the police and participation in their programs was divisive rather than integrative in its consequences. Near the bottom of the status ladder awareness and contact with community policing programs was less common, and people there were unaffected by their operation.

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